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requirement of a useable amount to sustain a conviction for illegal pos-
session of a narcotic, and established that the quantity was sufficient if
it were capable of chemical analysis and identification.
DOUGLAS S. WOOD
Federal Procedure-STANDING TO SUE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION SUITS. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
The Sierra Club' sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
from the proposed development of a resort area and the construction of
a highway on federal lands under the administrative jurisdiction of the
Departments of Agriculture and Interior. The plaintiffs contended that
in granting permits for the development the Secretaries exceeded their
authority, and that the result would be "permanent destruction of nat-
ural values" and "irreparable harm to the public interest." The district
court granted a preliminary injunction3 and the defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
injunction was improperly granted.4 Although determining that the de-
fendants should prevail on the merits, the court disposed of the case on
the theory that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary standing to sue.
"Simply stated but difficult to apply, standing has been called 'one
of the most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of the public
1. The Sierra Club is a non-profit California corporation organized for the purpose
of protecting the integrity of the environment and promoting conservation, and has a
history of involvement in the preservation of scenic and recreational resources. Although
the Club draws upon the entire country for its membership, the court found that there
was no allegation in the complaint that local residents of the Mineral King Valley were
members.
2. The Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to acceptance of the lowest bid for the
project, issued a permit for development to Walt Disney Industries. The proposed plan
called for the construction of overnight accommodations, automobile parking facilities,
a cog railway, ski trails and lifts, and sewage treatment plants. The State of California,
with the permission of the Secretary of Interior, proposed to construct an access road
and power transmission lines through the Sequoia National Park and Forest to facilitate
the proposed resort.
3. Sierra Club v. Hickel, No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., July 23, 1969). The court asserted
jurisdiction and granted relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(Supp. V, 1970), which provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." The injunction was issued under
the authority of 5 U.S.C. § 705 (Supp. V, 1970).
4. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted sub non. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 91 S.Ct. 870 (1971), reprinted in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REP. 1669 (1970).
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law.' "' In the early case of Frotbingbam v. Mellon6 the Supreme Court
dealt with the standing of an individual taxpayer, only indirectly af-
fected, to challenge the legality of governmental action.7 In holding
that a taxpayer qua taxpayer lacked the elements of standing to sue, the
Court phrased the test as one requiring injury, that is, that the plaintiff
has ". . . sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some di-
rect injury as a result of its [the statute's] enforcement . *..." 8
In 1939 the Court refined its position in Frothingham by specifying
the nature of the right to be protected.' Under this standard, it was
necessary to establish injury to a "legal right-one of property, one aris-
ing out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege." 10 This was the posi-
tion maintained by the Court until the landmark case of Flast v. Cohen"l
in 1968.
Distinguishable on its facts from Frothingbam,12 Flast again placed
5. 433 F.2d at 28, quoting from Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859,
861 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
6. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
7. The taxpayer sued the Secretary of the Treasury on the theory that federal ex-
penditures under the Maternity Act were illegal because the authorization exceeded
the authority conferred on Congress by the Constitution. Id. at 479.
8. Id. at 488.
9. Tennessee Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
10. 306 U.S. at 137-8. See also Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.
1943), which suggested the "private Attorney Generals" theory:
While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one, in the absence of an
actual justiciable controversy, to bring suit for the judicial determination
either of the constitutionality of a statute or the scope of powers con-
ferred by a statute upon government officers, it can constitutionally au-
thorize one of its own officials, such as the Attorney General, to bring a
proceeding to prevent another official from acting in violation of his
statutory powers; for then an actual controversy exists, and the Attorney
General can properly be vested with authority, in such a controversy, to
vindicate the interest of the public or the government. Instead of desig-
nating the Attorney General, or some other public officer, to bring such
proceedings, Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any
non-official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons, au-
thority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation of his
statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an actual controversy,
and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from empowering
any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such a contro-
versy, even if the so!e purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such
persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.
11. 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hobfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. RFv. 1033 (1968).
12. 392 U.S. at 104-06, 107, 114, 115, 117.
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before the Court the issue of the standing of a taxpayer to challenge the
legality of an administrative action. In finding that standing existed, the
Court determined that the difference between Flast and Frothingham
was the claim of an infringement of a constitutional right of the tax-
payer in Flast,'8 as opposed to a mere disagreeable appropriation by Con-
gress alleged by the taxpayer in Frothingham. It is clear, nevertheless,
that Flast seriously eroded the foundation of the Court's previous line
of decisions. 4 The inquiry was expanded from the nature of the right
to the interest of the plaintiff,' 5 and the test was stated in terms of "a
logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated." " To establish this nexus, the taxpayer was required to
show not only that she was directly affected by the governmental ac-
tion, but also that the action violated a protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.' 7
The Court developed a broader concept of standing in Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.'8 This test re-
quires the plaintiff to first show injury in fact, either economic or other-
wise, and secondly, that the interest involved is protected under the Con-
stitution or applicable statute.'9 This bifurcated standard closely par-
allels that established in Flast, for the aggrieved party must show that
both portions of the test are met in order to have standing to sue. How-
ever, by holding that the interest is no longer limited to the narrow
concept of legal rights, but ". . . may reflect 'aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational' as well as economic values," 20 the Court considerably
expanded the scope of the interests which may be adjudicated. Al-
13. The taxpayer claimed that the payment of federal funds in support of religious
and sectarian schools violated the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 85-86.
14. See, e.g., 392 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring); Davis, The Liberalized Law
of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968).
15. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 423 (1969): "In this sense, the concept
of standing focuses on the party seeking relief, rather than on the precise nature of
the relief sought.... The decisions of this Court have also made it clear that something
more than an 'adversary interest' is necessary to confer standing." See also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962): "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy, as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing."
16. 392 US. at 102.
17. Id. at 102-03.
18. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
19. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
20. Id. at 154.
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though the test as expressed clearly has two parts, the courts of appeals
have not been uniform in their application of it.21 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has adopted the most liberal construction and has made
the test solely one of injury in fact.22
The Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club also failed to apply the literal word-
ing of the Data Processing test. Although specifically questioning the
necessity of an inquiry into the nature of the interest, the court used
injury as the only determining factor,23 and decided that the interest of
the plaintiff was not sufficient even to establish this. In discussing the
prior cases in which the Sierra Club had been accorded standing, the
court determined that the key factor had been the joinder of the Club
with local organizations composed of residents or users of the area in
question.24 The court noted that although the interest alleged was con-
servational under the Data Processing rule the plaintiffs had failed to
show that it was of a serious enough nature to make them aggrieved or
adversely affected.
The opinion makes it clear that the nature of the injury must be a
legal wrong, and that displeasure with governmental action which affects
only a proclaimed conservational interest will not suffice. 5 Sierra Club,
21. Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970);
Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969); Southern Suburban Safeway Lines,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408
F.2d 1147 (1st Cir. 1969); Protestants and Other Americans v. Watson, 407 F.2d 1264
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970).
22. This was the test urged by Justices Brennen and White in Data Processing, 397
U.S. at 167 (concurring opinion); see, e.g., Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. S.E.C., 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
23. 433 F.2d at 31: "The significance of the language is not entirely clear.... We
submit that it does not establish a test separate and apart from or in addition to the test
which the Court first looked to...
24. Id. a 33:
In holding that the complaint fails to allege that the Club has the requisite
standing to institute this action, we are aware that federal courts have
accorded the Club standing to object to alleged administrative infringement
upon natural resources in two recent cases .... In both of these cases, how-
ever, the Sierra Club was joined by local conservationist organizations made
up of local residents and users of the area affected by the administrative
action. No such persons or organizations with a direct and obvious interest
have joined as plaintiffs in this action.
25. United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (radio station
listeners found to be persons aggrieved); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (specific statutory
provision granting standing, and actual economic interest affected); Powelton Civic
Home Owner's Ass'n v. Department of H.U.D., 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
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therefore, represents not only a serious impediment to environmental
protection suits by conservation groups having no legal interest, but also
a retreat from the recent holdings of the Supreme Court, and a return
to the test of violation of a legal right.
RICHARD C. JOSEPHSON
(persons whose homes and property would be taken to implement an urban renewal
project); Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (persons whose property would be taken by the construction). The court in
Sierra Club, 433 F.2d at 31, stated that "[tihe Po'welton case would be in point if the
homes of residents at Mineral King were to be razed and those homeowners objected",
thus indicating that the Ninth Circuit has yet to reject the old 'legal right' test of
Tennessee Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
It further appears to this writer that the interest and injury of the plaintiffs in United
Church was barely distinguishable from that of the Sierra Club in this case, and it is
submitted that the court's finding concerning the interest of the Club was unwarranted
and incorrect under a proper interpretation of Data Processing. See Hamley, J, con-
curring in Sierra Club, 433 F.2d at 38; Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair,
313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970); Davis supra note 21; Richards, Walton v. St. Clair:
The Standing Question, 4 NATuRAL REsouRcEs LAWYER 47 (1971); Note, The Essence
of Standing: The Basis of a Constitutional Right to be Heard, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 438
(1968).
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